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ABSTRACT
We propose a game theoretic framework for task allocation
in mobile cloud computing that corresponds to offloading of
compute tasks to a group of nearby mobile devices. Specif-
ically, in our framework, a distributor node holds a multi-
dimensional auction for allocating the tasks of a job among
nearby mobile nodes based on their computational capabil-
ities and also the cost of computation at these nodes, with
the goal of reducing the overall job completion time. Our
proposed auction also has the desired incentive compatibil-
ity property that ensures that mobile devices truthfully re-
veal their capabilities and costs and that those devices ben-
efit from the task allocation. To deal with node mobility,
we perform multiple auctions over adaptive time intervals.
We develop a heuristic approach to dynamically find the
best time intervals between auctions to minimize unneces-
sary auctions and the accompanying overheads. We evalu-
ate our framework and methods using both real world and
synthetic mobility traces. Our evaluation results show that
our game theoretic framework improves the job completion
time by a factor of 2-5 in comparison to the time taken for
executing the job locally, while minimizing the number of
auctions and the accompanying overheads. Our approach
is also profitable for the nearby nodes that execute the dis-
tributor’s tasks with these nodes receiving a compensation
higher than their actual costs.
1. INTRODUCTION
Personal mobile devices such as smartphones and tablets
are increasingly being used for in our daily lives. Many
more smartphones are being sold worldwide than the total
sales of PCs [1] and this growth in sales of smartphones is
expected to continue in the future. Furthermore, various
advances in technology are making these devices powerful
tools capable of performing complex tasks, including speech
to text conversion, audio identification, and image recogni-
tion. However, despite these advances, resources on mobile
devices are constrained by weight and size requirements of
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the device that must be met for the devices to be easily
carried around. Therefore, mobile devices still have limited
battery, storage, heat dissipation ability, etc which impede
complex and resource intensive task execution. A possible
remedy for tackling resource limitations of mobile devices is
to offload the computational tasks to the cloud.
Mobile Cloud Computing (MCC) generally refers to a
client-server communication model where a mobile device
(client) offloads computing tasks to the remote cloud through
a wireless network (mainly cellular or WiFi networks) [6,7].
However, this model of mobile cloud computing is facing
some important challenges. First, the performance of MCC
is highly depend on wireless communication networks. With
the tremendous growth of mobile data users, the wide-area
mobile data access links (e.g., backhaul links in a cellular
network) are becoming a bottleneck. This trend is expected
to continue at even higher scales in the future because ser-
vice providers, specifically cellular service providers, are un-
able to upgrade their backhaul networks due to shrinking
profits. Thus, the MCC model can suffer from high latency
and slow data transfer which may not be acceptable for the
users of mobile applications. Second, although the cloud
provides shared resources and amortizes costs, its operation
requires establishment and maintenance of highly expensive
hardware to run the high computational tasks.
A possible remedy for tackling resource limitations of mo-
bile devices when performing complex tasks, while not re-
quiring the use of a server cloud and also minimizing laten-
cies, is to offload computing tasks to nearby mobile devices.
For example, in the speech to text conversion application, a
mobile device can divide the audio file into smaller pieces,
then assign each piece to a nearby device, and finally, com-
bine the results obtained from nearby devices. Offloading
compute tasks to nearby mobile devices rather than using a
remote cloud through the mobile data cellular network low-
ers the latency and the burden on network backhaul. The
nearby mobile devices, collectively and opportunistically, es-
sentially provide the power of a cloud. Thus, we have an-
other notion of mobile cloud computing that corresponds
to offloading of compute tasks to a group of nearby mobile
devices connected by various types of links including D2D,
WiFi Direct, Bluetooth, etc. In this paper, we use this sec-
ond notion of mobile cloud computing.
There is a growing amount of work to utilize mobile device
computing power for cloud computing. Hyrax [13] uses the
computational power of a network of android smartphones
in MapReduce. Mobile Device Clouds [14,15] and Serendip-
ity [20] are platforms for opportunistic computing where a
mobile device offloads computing tasks to nearby mobile de-
vices. NativeBOINC for Android [2] is another examples of
utilizing mobile devices’ computing power. Recently, Habak
et al. [9] proposed FemtoCloud where a controller executes
a variety of tasks arriving at controller by using the com-
putational power of nearby mobile devices. SymbIoT [18]
is another platform that uses the computational capability
of all mobile devices within the same network to perform
different tasks.
In this paper, we examine a scenario where a mobile de-
vice or a central controller, that we call a distributor node,
has a computational job or a set of different computational
jobs and wants to utilize resources of nearby mobile nodes
to reduce the job completion time. Due to mobility, the dis-
tributor (mobile device or a central controller) has frequent
contacts with other mobile devices that can provide the re-
quired computational resources. The problem faced by the
distributor is how to select the nearby nodes and divide the
job among them in a manner that is beneficial to all the
parties involved.
While the problem of using other nodes for executing the
tasks of a job has been widely used in distributed comput-
ing [3, 4], cyber foraging [5], and crowdsourcing [8],the ex-
isting work on task allocation cannot be simply adopted for
mobile cloud computing. First, the task allocation method
must take into account the selfish behavior of mobile nodes
by providing incentives for them. This because in mobile
cloud computing, a rational mobile node would not be will-
ing to lend its resources (and thereby deplete its battery)
unless it receives some payoff as compensation. Second, mo-
bile devices can have different hardware/software and thus
have different capabilities. For this reason, the execution
time of a specific task can be different across mobile de-
vices. Therefore, the task allocation mechanism must con-
sider the heterogeneity of mobile devices to reduce the over-
all job completion time. Third, the task allocation needs to
take into account the mobility of nodes. In a mobile envi-
ronment, the distributor may observe disconnection of nodes
with assigned tasks, and new arrivals that might provide
high computational capabilities. Thus, decisions should be
made according to the dynamics of the environment. Fourth,
and very importantly, the distributor node should see a clear
benefit in terms of job completion time.
We propose a game theoretic framework for task alloca-
tion that provides incentive for all mobile nodes. In our
framework, the distributor node holds a multidimensional
auction for allocating the tasks of a job among nearby mo-
bile nodes based on their computational capabilities and also
the cost of computation at these nodes, with the goal of re-
ducing the overall job completion time. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the first work that presents a multidimen-
sional auction for task allocation in mobile cloud computing.
Our proposed auction also has desired economic properties
(that we formally prove later in the paper) including incen-
tive compatibility which ensures that players truthfully re-
veal their capabilities and costs, and that mobile nodes act
cooperatively in the proposed auction for the benefit of all
the parties involved. We also consider the mobility of mobile
nodes in our game theoretic framework. In such a mobile
environment, the topology of the network may change over
time. Thus, some nearby nodes may get disconnected from
the distributor before completing the assigned task, resulting
in an increased job completion time. To deal with mobility,
we perform multiple auctions over adaptive time intervals.
We develop a heuristic approach to dynamically find the
best time intervals between auctions to minimize unneces-
sary auctions and the accompanying overheads. We briefly
explore the privacy of the distributor and the nearby mobile
devices and show a tradeoff between providing privacy, and
the profits for the parties involved.
We evaluate our framework and methods using both real
world and synthetic mobility traces. We use two models of
compute jobs - a simple single job model, and a multiple
job model that uses a Directed Acyclic graph to represent
causal dependencies in a set of jobs. Our evaluation results
show that our game theoretic framework improves the job
completion time by a factor of 2-5 in comparison to the
local execution of the job, in both the job models, while
minimizing the number of auctions. Thus, our approach is
beneficial for the distributor in terms of enhancing its per-
formance. We also show that the nearby nodes that execute
the distributor’s tasks receive a compensation higher than
their actual costs.
2. RELATED WORK
Many existing works in distributed computing (e.g.,SETI@
Home [4], BOINC [3], and cyber foraging [5]) have proposed
using other nodes for executing the tasks of a job. How-
ever, all of these existing works primarily assume altruistic
behavior in the distributed computing environment and do
not carefully incentivize resource sharing. Like our work,
Serendipity [20] enables remote computing among a set of
intermittently connected mobile devices. However, our work
differs from Serendipity in the following significant ways.
First and foremost, Serendipity does not incentivize resource
sharing. Second, it does not consider heterogeneity among
mobile devices in task allocation. Moreover, all assigned
tasks are assumed to have equal workload. Third, Serendip-
ity does not use any adaptive methods for reassigning tasks.
Our game theoretic framework is inspired by the multi-
dimensional mechanism proposed for the second score auc-
tion [16], where the authors use a linear function to map
the multidimensional bid into a single dimension. However,
we use a fractional function for the mapping which is more
suitable to our setting (see equation 1). We also extend the
existing multidimensional mechanism by allowing selection
of k items while considering a budget limit instead of selec-
tion of only one item. The use of multidimensional auction
allows us to consider the heterogeneity of nearby resources
in task allocation. We also minimize the number of auctions
and the accompanying overhead by developing a heuristic
approach for finding the best time intervals between auc-
tions.
Existing incentive mechanisms that have been used for
task allocation [17,21,23], do not consider multidimensional
auction where both cost and the service quotient are im-
portant. The authors in [11] proposed a multidimensional
optimal auction to provide incentive in mobile ad hoc net-
work routing, considering both cost and the path duration
in route selection. However, their proposed approach only
works for time related bids such as path duration where the
players cannot over-report the time related bid. In our task
allocation problem, players can over-report and under-report
both cost and the committed service quotient.
Table 1: Notation
Parameter Definition
(ci, si) The cost and committed service quotient for player i
aci,si Allocation rule for player i with type (ci, si)
ui(ci, si) Utility of player i with type (ci, si)
p(aci,si) Payment to player i under allocation rule aci,si
B The distributor budget limit
D The total workload of job
T Time interval between auctions
b Linear increase factor in heuristic approach
3. PROBLEM FORMULATION AND SOLU-
TION
We consider mobile cloud computing in the presence of
selfish smart phones. We assume that all smart phones act
rationally and selfishly, and their main goal is to maximize
their own profits, not to harm others. There is a distributor
node that wants to offload a computational job, with a total
work load of D units, to its nearby nodes with the goal
of reducing the overall job completion time. Since a smart
phone incurs a cost (in form of resource and battery usage)
while performing a task on behalf of the distributor, it may
not be willing to participate unless the distributor provides
right incentives.
We propose a multidimensional auction to model the job/
task allocation in mobile cloud computing. In our auction,
the distributor holds the auction among n nearby smart
phones called players. Each player i has an individual pri-
vate value ti called its type which consists of the following
two parameters:
• si: the committed service quotient that player i can
provide. In distributed computing applications such
as speech to text conversion, the service quotient is re-
lated to the amount of data that the smart phone can
process in a given time (the smart phone finds this in-
formation by estimating its maximum execution time
running synthetic benchmark and its energy consump-
tion using techniques like PowerBooter [22]). In our
system, si denotes the amount of data that player i
can process per second. It should be noted that the
distributor is not aware of the actual sis until the tasks
are completed and the results are received from nearby
players who have been assigned the tasks.
• ci: the cost of player i for performing the task with
the committed service quotient. ci is a function of
the committed service quotient, si, and the player’s
private cost of performing the task, θi. We bound θi
such that 0 < θmin ≤ θmax < ∞. θi is affected by
various parameters such as processor speed, available
storage, remaining battery level, communication cost,
etc. ci is an increasing function of both si and θi, and
is private information of the player i, hence, no one
else can determine the exact value of ci.
Our mechanism works as follows. First, the distributor
sends a probe message to find the nearby nodes. Then,
each nearby node i, interested in participating, replies by
announcing its bid (ci, si). Note that (ci, si) announced by
the node i need not be the actual private value of its type,
ti. Based on the received bids, the distributor selects a set
of players and assigns the tasks to them in proportion to
their committed service quotient. To provide incentive to
the players for their resources, the distributor compensates
them by paying the players. The distributor also has incen-
tive to offload tasks to nearby mobile devices because the
overall job completion time is less than the time taken for
executing the job locally. Therefore, our game theoretical
framework is beneficial to all parties involved.
Our mechanism implements truthfulness in dominant equi-
librium implying that each player’s best strategy, regardless
of other players strategies, is to bid truthfully (i.e. to report
actual values of si and ci). Table 1 summarizes the notation
we use in this and the subsequent sections.
3.1 Allocation Mechanism
In this section, we specify how the distributor selects the
nearby mobile devices by considering both the cost and the
service quotient. The distributor wants players with mini-
mum cost and maximum service quotient. For this reason,
the distributor defines a weights function for player i with
type (ci, si) as follows:
wi =
si
ci
(1)
The distributor must also determine how many players it
should select. Intuitively, the number of players affects the
job completion time and the sum of premiums paid by the
distributor to the players over the players’ actual costs (over-
payments). As the number of selected players is increased,
the job completion time decreases due to more tasks being
executed in parallel. However, the increase in number of
selected players also increases the overpayments.
To limit its cost, the distributor defines a budget limit B
as the maximum amount that it can pay for the processing of
one unit of data per second. B is a function of the distributor
utility, ud. An increase in the distributor utility, ud, makes
the distributor willing to increase its budget limit. Formally,
B(ud) =


f+(umaxd ) ud > u
max
d
f+(ud) u
min
d ≤ ud ≤ u
max
d
0 ud < u
min
d
(2)
Here, umind and u
max
d are the minimum and the maximum
utilities that the distributor expects when using our task al-
location framework. When the obtained utility, ud, is less
than umind , the distributor prefers to execute the job locally.
By increasing the value of ud between u
min
d and u
max
d , the
distributor is willing to use the task allocation framework. In
this case, the budget limit is a nondecreasing function of ud
(f+(ud) represents the nondecreasing function of ud). u
max
d
is the saturation point. Increasing the value of ud beyond
this saturation point does not increase the budget limit, B.
The distributor determines umind , u
max
d , and f
+(ud) depend-
ing on the application. For example, the distributor may
prefer to choose a constant function for f+(ud), if the dis-
tributor utility, ud, be above u
min
d or the distributor may
select an increasing exponential function for f+(ud) in real
time applications where time is critical.
Let tO represent the job completion time when the distrib-
utor uses our task allocation framework, and let tL represent
the job completion time when the distributor executes the
job locally. Also, let eO and eL be the energy consumption
when the distributor using our task allocation framework
and when the distributor executing the job locally. Then,
the distributor utility, ud, will be:
ud = α(tL − tO) + β(eL − eO) (3)
The values of α and β determine the importance of job
completion time and energy consumption in the distribu-
tor utility. In our evaluation, the distributor only wants to
reduce the job completion time and ignores the energy con-
sumption (we set α = 1 and β = 0). We ignore the energy
consumption for the following reasons. First, our task al-
location is designed for high computational tasks such as
audio identification and image recognition. In this case, the
energy consumption for executing task, eL, is greater than
the energy consumption for communication and transferring
data among nearby mobile nodes, eO. Second, in our task
allocation framework, a computing cloud refers to a group of
nearby mobile devices that connect by WiFi and Bluetooth.
Thus, the energy consumption for communication and data
transferring is less than the common client-server cloud.
Also, note that the distributor computes tO by consid-
ering the pre-processing time, the overhead of dividing job
into tasks, the post-processing overhead of assembling the
results, and the maximum job completion time among the
selected nearby mobile nodes (the distributor can estimate
the job completion time in each nearby mobile user by using
their declared service quotients).
Now the goal is to select a subset of players that maximize
the total weight under the budget limit constraint. We use
a simple and efficient greedy approach for allocation. First,
the distributor orders the players based on their decreas-
ing weights. Next, it selects the largest number of players
{1, 2, 3, . . . , k} that satisfy the budget limit constraint (i.e.
constraint 9). By considering the budget limit constraint,
the distributor obtains at least the minimum utility, umind .
Therefore, participating in the task allocation is beneficial
for the distributor. In the next section, we explain the pay-
ment function that the distributor pays to the nearby mobile
users to provide incentives for them to participate in the task
allocation.
3.2 Payment Mechanism
In this section, we determine the payment Mechanism.
The payment Mechanism must provide the following desir-
able economic properties to ensure that players act cooper-
atively and bid truthfully.
• Individual Rationality : The utility of all players should
always be non-negative. Otherwise, players may choose
to not participate.
• Incentive Compatibility : In an incentive compatible
mechanism, no selfish node has incentive to lie (also
called truthfulness).
Let aci,si ∈ {0, 1} denote the allocation to player i with type
(ci, si) where if the distributor offloads task to the player,
aci,si = 1, otherwise, aci,si = 0. Also, let pi(aci,si) be
the payment that the distributor pays to the player i under
allocation rule aci,si . Then, the utility of player i with type
(ci, si) is obtained from the following formula:
ui(ci, si) = pi(aci,si)− ci (4)
Having determined the utility of players, the payment Mech-
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Figure 1: d(si, s
′
i) (a) and the utility (b) for different
values of s′i, with si = 0.9 Mbytes/sec.
anism must satisfy the following constraints.
∀i, c′i, pi(aci,si)− ci ≥ pi(ac′
i
,si
)− ci (5)
∀i, s′i, pi(aci,si)− ci ≥ pi(aci,s′i)− ci (6)
∀i, c′i, s
′
i, pi(aci,si)− ci ≥ pi(ac′
i
,s′
i
)− ci (7)
∀i, pi(aci,si)− ci ≥ 0 (8)
n∑
i=1
pi(aci,si)
si
≤ B(ud) (9)
Constraints 5, 6, and 7 provide incentive compatibility for
both cost and the committed service quotient. Constraint
8 is for individual rationality, and constraint 9 captures the
budget limit of the distributor.
The payment to player i consists of two parts:
pi(aci,si) =
{
p1i (aci,si) + p
2
i (aci,si) i ≤ k
0 i > k
(10)
Where p1i (aci,si) is paid to provide incentive compatibility
for ci and p
2
i (aci,si) is paid to provide incentive compatibility
for both ci and si. p
1
i is obtained from the following formula:
p
1
i (aci,si) =
sick+1
sk+1
(11)
Here, k + 1 is the index of the player with largest weight
after the selected k players.
Let si be the actual service quotient (e.g., the amount of
data that player i can process per second) that the distrib-
utor finds after the task completion by player i, and also let
s′i be the announced service quotient by the same player.
Then, the second payment, p2i , is of the following form.
p
2
i (aci,si) = d(si, s
′
i)(si − s
′
i) (12)
Here, d(si, s
′
i) is a positive and nondecreasing function
of (si − s
′
i) < 0, that determines the impact of misreport-
ing the service quotient. A suitable choice for the function
d(si, s
′
i) must satisfy the following three properties. First,
if the player i over-reports its committed service quotient
(si < s
′
i), then p
2
i (aci,si) must be negative, i.e., the player
must give back some money to the distributor. Second, a
player must not pay a penalty for under-reporting its com-
mitted service quotient, i.e., when si > s
′
i, d(si, s
′
i) = 0.
Third, the choice of d(si, s
′
i) should lend itself to satisfy-
ing the incentive compatibility property. In this paper, we
define d(si, s
′
i) as follows:
d(si, s
′
i) =
{
0 si ≥ s
′
i
(s′i − si)
2 +
ck+1
sk+1
si < s
′
i
(13)
This definition of d(si, s
′
i) satisfies the first two required
properties described above. We show that this choice of
d(si, s
′
i) helps satisfy the incentive compatibility property in
Lemma 2. Figure 1(a) shows an instantiation of d(si, s
′
i).
In this figure, the actual value of the service quotient is 0.9
Mbytes/sec. As shown in the figure, the value of d(si, s
′
i)
increases if the player declares its committed service quotient
(s′i) to be greater than its actual service quotient. Also,
the value of d(si, s
′
i) is zero if the player under-reports its
committed service quotient.
Note that other choices of d(si, s
′
i) are also possible. De-
pending on the application, we can choose different functions
for d(si, s
′
i). For example, in some applications the value of
si might vary with changes in the environment that are not
within the of control of the player. To provide incentive
compatibility and to also prevent nonessential punishment,
we can also define d(si, s
′
i) as follows:
d(si, s
′
i) =
{
0 si ≥ s
′
i
ck+1
sk+1
si < s
′
i
(14)
In this case, if the player over-reports its committed service
quotient (si < s
′
i), then the payment is:
pi(aci,s′i) =
s′ick+1
sk+1
+ (si − s
′
i)
ck+1
sk+1
=
ck+1
sk+1
si = pi(aci,si)
This payment is the same as the payment if the player wants
to act truthfully. Therefore, the player has no incentive to
lie. On the other hand, if the committed service quotient
reduces after the player declares it, the player is paid only
for the service quotient it accomplishes. We can also add a
small reward if the player under-reports its committed ser-
vice quotient (si > s
′
i). The amount of reward should be less
than the amount of payment when the player acts truthfully
(si = s
′
i). The player has no incentive to under-report its
committed service quotient. However, if the the committed
service quotient increases after the player declares it, the
player has an added incentive to provide a better service
quotient.
Having determined the allocation rule and the payment
policy, we must now prove the economic properties of our
multidimensional auction, namely individual rationality and
incentive compatibility using the definition of d(si, s
′
i) in
equation 13. The same reasoning can be applied to other
definitions of d(si, s
′
i), e.g., in equation 14.
3.3 Proofs
Players may cheats about their types, (c, s), to gain ex-
tra profit. Incentive compatibility (IC) ensures that players
truthfully reveal their actual types. In a multidimensional
mechanism, proving IC is challenging. This is because sev-
eral cheating scenarios, formed from combinations of cheat-
ing in each dimension, must be considered. We must prove
IC in the following conditions.
1. The truthful revelation of a player’s cost (c) is a domi-
nant equilibrium, given that the player reveals its com-
mitted service quotient (s) truthfully (constraint 5).
2. The truthful revelation of a player’s committed service
quotient (s) is a dominant equilibrium, given that the
player reveals its cost (c) truthfully (constraint 6).
3. The truthful revelation of a player’s cost and commit-
ted service quotient (c, s) is a dominant equilibrium
(constraint 7).
Lemma 1. Given the committed service quotient (s), truth-
fully revealing the cost (c) results in a dominant equilibrium.
Proof. There are two possible cases:
• Player is one of the winners. If by over-reporting or
under-reporting, the player still remains a winner, the
utility of the player does not change. If the player
become a loser by over-reporting, then the utility of
the player becomes zero which is less than that it can
obtain by acting truthfully. Therefore, in this case, the
player has no incentive to lie.
• Player is one of the losers. If by over-reporting or
under-reporting the player remains a loser, the utility
of the player dose not change (it is still zero). On
the other hand, if a player, (without loss of generality)
k + 1, under-reports the value of ck+1 to become a
winner (i.e.,
sk+1
c′
k+1
>
sk
ck
), its utility becomes:
uk+1(c
′
k+1, sk+1) =
sk+1ck
sk
− ck+1 (15)
However, we know that sk
ck
>
sk+1
ck+1
. This means that
ck+1 >
sk+1ck
sk
. Therefore, the utility is negative and
the player has no incentive to lie.
Lemma 2. Given the cost (c), truthfully revealing the com-
mitted service quotient (s) results in a dominant equilibrium.
Proof. We show that the utility of the player has its
maximum value at s′i = si. Thus, the player has no interest
to misreport s.
By substituting p1 and p2 in equation 4 and taking deriva-
tive with respect to s′i,
∂ui
∂s′i
=
ck+1
sk+1
+
∂d(si, s
′
i)
∂s′i
(si − s
′
i)− d(si, s
′
i)
For s′i = si,
∂ui
∂s′
i
= 0. For s′i ∈ (si,+∞], given that
∂d(si,s
′
i
)
∂s′
i
is positive, ∂ui
∂s′
i
is negative. Also, for s′i ∈ (0, si],
∂ui
∂s′
i
is
positive. As a result, s′i = si is the maximum point. Fig-
ure 1(b), shows the utility of a player for different values of
s′i. This figure also shows that the utility is maximum at
point s′i = si.
Lemma 3. Truthfully revealing both cost and the commit-
ted service quotient (c, s) results in a dominant equilibrium.
Proof. Let c′ and s′ be the declared cost and the com-
mitted service quotient of a player. Also, let c, and s be
the actual cost and preformed service quotient. Then, to
prove incentive compatibility, we should consider the follow-
ing four cases.
1. c′ < c and s′ < s. If the player is already a winner
and also wins by misreporting, then the utility of the
winner will be less than that when acting truthfully.
ui(c
′
i, s
′
i) =
s′ick+1
sk+1
− ci
Given that s′i < si, ui(ci, si) > ui(c
′
i, s
′
i) and the player
has no incentive to lie. If the player is not a winner,
but wins the game by misreporting, then the utility
of the player becomes negative (proof is similar to the
second case of Lemma 1).
2. c′ > c and s′ < s. If the player is already a winner and
still wins the game by misreporting, the utility of the
player will decrease. On the other hand, if the player
is not a winner, then it cannot win by misreporting.
Thus, its utility does not change.
3. c′ < c and s′ > s. If the player is already a winner and
remains a winner by misreporting, then the utility of
the player is as follows.
ui(c
′
i, s
′
i) =
s′ick+1
sk+1
− ci + (si − s
′
i)(
ck+1
sk+1
+ (s′i − si)
2)
By substituting s′i with si + (s
′
i − si), we have
ui(c
′
i, s
′
i) =
sick+1
sk+1
− ci + (si − s
′
i)(s
′
i − si)
2
which is less than the case where the player acts truth-
fully. If the player is not a winner, but wins the game
by misreporting, its utility becomes
uk+1(c
′
k+1, s
′
k+1) =
sk+1ck
sk
− ck+1 +
(
(s′k+1 − sk+1)
2
)
(sk+1 − s
′
k+1)
The first term
sk+1ck
sk
− ck+1 is negative, because
sk
ck
>
sk+1
ck+1
. The second term
(
(s′k+1 − sk+1)
2
)
(sk+1− s
′
k+1)
is also negative, sk+1 < s
′
k+1. Thus the utility is neg-
ative in this case.
4. c′ > c and s′ > s. If the player is already a win-
ner and still wins by misreporting, then the utility of
player decreases. Also, if the player is not a winner,
but wins the game by misreporting, then its utility
becomes negative.
We must now prove that the proposed multidimensional
auction is individually rational. This property ensures that
players participate in the task allocation game.
Lemma 4. The proposed multidimensional auction satis-
fies the individual rationality constraint (constraint 8).
Proof. We need to show that when players act truth-
fully, their utilities are greater than or equal to zero. If the
player is not a winner, then its utility is zero. If the player
is a winner then its utility is determined as follows.
ui(ci, si) =
sick+1
sk+1
− ci
Given that si
ci
>
sk+1
ck+1
, the utility of the winner is posi-
tive.
3.4 Task allocation
We now propose the task allocation policy among the k
selected players to reduce the job completion time using dif-
ferent models of compute jobs.
Single job: In some applications such as audio to text con-
version, we only have one job. In such a single job scenario,
the workload assigned to each player is proportional to its
committed service quotient (in the mobility aware approach
in the next section, we also consider the auction time inter-
val in the task allocation towards ensuring that the selected
nodes are able to complete the assigned task before the dis-
tributor preforms the next auction). For example, for player
i the amount of workload is equal to D si∑k
i=1
si
, where D is
the total workload. In this case, all selected players execute
the assigned tasks in parallel that reduces the job comple-
tion time. Any other task allocation, reduces the number
of tasks executing in parallel and consequently increases the
job completion time.
DAG jobs: There are some applications that contain a
set of jobs where the execution of jobs have causal ordering.
We use a Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) to represent causal
dependencies in a set of jobs. In our DAG, nodes correspond
to jobs and directed links represent the causal dependencies.
Figure 2 shows an example of a DAG representing a set of
jobs.
We can use the same task allocation as the single job for
DAG jobs. For dependent jobs, we execute jobs sequen-
tially and assign workloads to the selected k players in pro-
portion to their committed service quotients. For indepen-
dent jobs, we can run them in parallel. For example, job B
and C in figure 2 are independent and can be run in paral-
lel. Let D1, and D2 be the total workloads of jobs B, and
C, respectively. Then the assigned workload to player i is
D1
si∑
k
i=1
si
+D2
si∑
k
i=1
si
.
Indivisible jobs: In some applications, jobs are indivisi-
ble. Even for indivisible jobs, the proposed game theoretic
framework can be used to provide incentives, utilize nearby
resources, and reduce the job completion time.
For a single indivisible job, the distributor selects only one
nearby device and assigns the whole job if the job execution
time is less than the time taken in executing the job locally.
For indivisible DAG jobs, the distributor acts in the same
manner as it would for the single indivisible job scenario, for
all dependent jobs and executes them sequentially. For all
independent jobs, the distributor executes them in parallel.
First, it selects k nearby smart phones where k is equal to
the number of independent jobs, by considering the budget
limit constraint. For task allocation, the distributor ranks
the independent jobs in the following manner. For each inde-
pendent job, the distributor computes the total remaining
job load from the node corresponding to the independent
job to the leaf of the DAG. Then, it assigns ranks to the
independent jobs in decreasing order of the remaining load.
Next, the highest rank job is assigned to the selected player
with the highest value of committed service quotient. Let
50, 100, 100, 50 be the workload of jobs B, C, D, and E,
respectively in Figure 2. Then the total remaining job loads
from B, and C are 200, and 150, respectively. Therefore, in
allocating tasks, the distributor assigns C to selected player
with the highest committed service quotient.
Although our game theoretic framework can be used for
task allocation where jobs are indivisible, it is likely to have
lower efficiency compared to local execution, in terms of job
completion time. Specially, when we have computationally
intensive indivisible jobs in an environment with high mobil-
ity (i.e., nearby mobile nodes are disconnected before com-
pleting the assigned task). Note that for divisible jobs, we
deal with mobility by preforming multiple auctions with dy-
namic time intervals (see section 4).
4. MOBILITY AWARE APPROACH
So far, we have implicitly assumed that the mobile devices
are available for entire duration of the task computations.
However, because of mobility of the distributor or the play-
ers, the topology of network may change and consequently,
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Figure 2: Example of DAG jobs.
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Figure 3: Average percentage of disconnected
nodes versus the time interval between auctions.
some mobile smart phones may get disconnected before com-
pleting the assigned tasks. Furthermore, some other smart
phones might arrive in the vicinity of the distributor with
higher computational power and less cost. To deal with such
device mobility, instead of holding the auction only once, we
hold the auction multiple times. The key challenge in hold-
ing the auction multiple times is the determination of the
time interval between auctions.
When we perform the auction very frequently, we are able
to find newly arriving smart phones. Note that the dura-
tion of the task allocated to the smart phones is limited
by the time between auctions. Therefore, when the time
between auctions is short, the chance that a smart phone
gets disconnected before completing its assigned task will
decrease. However, the number of auctions and the accom-
panying overheads will increase, since each time the distrib-
utor needs to probe to find the neighboring smart phones
and their type values. On the other hand, if we hold the
auction less frequently, then there is a higher chance that
smart phones get disconnected before performing the as-
signed tasks. Also, we may lose potential computational
power of newly arriving smart phones. As a result, we may
see higher job completion times. Therefore, there is a trade-
off between the overhead due to the number of times that
we perform the auction and the job completion time.
Figure 3 shows the average percentage of disconnected
nodes versus the time interval between two auctions (or dis-
tributor probes) for three different real world contact traces.
The three real contact traces were collected as a part of the
Haggle Project [19] at the Intel research lab, at the Univer-
sity of Cambridge Computer Laboratory, and during the In-
focom05 conference, respectively. This figure shows that in
all three experiments, as we increase the time interval from
20 to 500 seconds, the average percentage of disconnected
nodes increases, consequently, increasing the job completion
time in our task allocation mechanism.
Instead of using a fixed time interval between auctions,
we propose an adaptive approach that modifies the time
interval dynamically based on the mobility of the nodes in
the environment. Our goal is to reduce the number of times
we preform the auction without significantly increasing the
job completion time.
We use AIMD (Additive Increase and Multiplicative De-
crease) approach to adaptively set the time interval between
two auctions. We use AIMD for two reasons. First, in real
world scenarios, the change in the number of contacts has
been shown to follow a power law distribution with a bursty
traffic pattern [12], i.e. a large number of contacts arrive or
leave a specific place over a short period of time. This im-
plies that the time interval between two auctions, T , should
decrease rapidly when a change is observed in the number of
connections. Second, AIMD is a stable adaptive approach
that is widely used in networking protocols such as TCP.
We describe our adaptive approach as follows. We start
with a fixed time interval, T . Then, we update the value
of T by comparing the results from the previous auction.
If no change in the number of connections is observed, we
conservatively increase the value of T linearly (by a constant
value of b seconds). Otherwise, we decrease the value of T
multiplicatively by a factor of 2. Therefore, the value of T
increases slowly when there is no change, and it decreases
rapidly in case of change in the number of connections from
one auction to the next. More specifically, the value of T is
obtained from the following formula.
T (i+ 1) =
{
max(T (i)
2
, Tmin) Nci 6= Nci+1
min(T (i) + b, Tmax) otherwise
(16)
where, Tmin and Tmax are the minimum and the maximum
values of T , respectively. Nci denotes the contact set at the
beginning of time interval i.
5. PRIVACY
Another important issue in MCC is the privacy of data.
In our game theoretic framework the distributor violates the
privacy of data by offloading a computational job to the
nearby mobile devices. Let j = {1, . . . ,m} denote a set of
computational jobs that the distributor wants to execute.
We formulate the privacy risk for distributor, PR(d), as the
following:
PR(d) =
m∑
j=1
ρjvj (17)
ρj ∈ [0, 1] in equation 17 determines the sensitivity of the
computational job j. vj represents the visibility of job j
and is equal to the number of selected mobile devices by the
distributor for executing tasks of job j.
As the above formulation shows, the privacy risk for the
distributor, PR(d), increases by increasing the number of
selected mobile devices. However, the job completion time
decreases as the number of selected mobile devices is in-
creased. Figure 4(a) shows the tradeoff between PR(d) and
the job completion time. Note that the distributor can pro-
vide privacy by adding another constraint for privacy risk
in both allocation and payment mechanism at the cost of
increasing the job completion time.
Besides distributor, the nearby mobile devices also violate
their privacy by revealing their computational capabilities
and the cost of computation. To examine the impact of pri-
vacy on the nearby mobile users utilities, we define the pri-
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Figure 4: (a) CDF of job completion time for different values PR(d) (b) CDF of utility of mobile devices for
different values of privacy parameter, x.
vacy parameter x ∈ [0, 1] where the mobile device conceals
the actual value of cost, c, and the actual value of service
quotient, s, by a factor x. I.e, c′ = xc and s′ = 1
x
s (we only
consider the case where the mobile device decreases the ac-
tual value of cost and increases the actual value of service
quotient. For all the other cases, it is obvious that the utility
of mobile device decreases by concealing the actual values
of cost and service quotient). Figure 4(b) shows the CDF of
nearby mobile devices’ utilities for different values of x. This
figure shows that the mobile devices can provide privacy at
the cost of decreasing their utilities and the highest utility
is obtained if the mobile devices act truthfully, x = 1, and
reveal their actual costs and computational capabilities as
we proved in Section 3.3.
6. EVALUATION
6.1 Experimental Setup
To evaluate our task allocation method and its overhead,
we use a custom simulator, that we develop using Matlab,
to simulate the speech to text conversion application un-
der different mobility conditions. Instead of performing the
conversion at the distributor, the audio file of the speech is
divided into smaller files and nearby smart phones are used
to convert the small audio files to text files and send back
the results to the distributor who finally combines them.
In our simulation, each player chooses its cost of process-
ing the audio file (c) from a uniform distribution in interval
[1, 5]. The size of of audio file that a player can process
per second (s) is selected randomly from a uniform distribu-
tion [50KB, 125KB]. The distributor’s budget limit func-
tion (B(ud)) is a constant function 50 per megabyte of data
for the distributor utility ud to be positive (note that other
functions are also possible). Also, Tmin, Tmax, that repre-
sent the maximum and minimum values for the time interval
between auctions, are set to 20s, and 500s respectively. Fi-
nally, the linear increase factor in the heuristic approach (b)
is set to 20s in all experiments. All the results are obtained
by averaging over 1000 randomly selected samples.
We evaluate our task allocation method for two scenar-
ios. In our first scenario, we assume that the neighboring
nodes are available during the whole computation. In our
second scenario, we consider the mobility of nodes and the
possibility of disconnection during computations. To evalu-
ate the mobility aware approach in the second scenario, we
use three real contact traces with different contact proper-
ties. These traces were collected as a part of the Haggle
Project [19]. The first data set was collected at Intel re-
search lab, the second set was collected at the University of
Cambridge Computer Laboratory, and the third set was col-
lected during the Infocom05 conference. We select 9 nodes
from the first set and 12 nodes from the second and third
sets. We also use two synthetic mobility models namely
the Slaw mobility model [12] and the Random Walk mobil-
ity model(RW) [10]. The Slaw model captures many of the
statistical properties of human mobility, while the Random
Walk model provides high mobility and abrupt changes in
movement patterns [10].
6.2 Results
We evaluate our task allocation method in terms of both
the job completion time and the overhead. To quantify the
overhead, we measure the number of times that the auc-
tion is preformed before task completion. We also use the
speedup ratio metric to evaluate the speed up in the job
completion time as a result of offloading tasks to other smart
phones. The speedup ratio is obtained by dividing the job
completion time in locally executing the job by the job com-
pletion time in our distributed approach. The speedup ratio
shows the performance benefits where we provide the re-
quired incentives for the nearby mobile devices to lend their
resources with the case where there is no incentive model
and selfish nearby mobile devices would not be willing to
lend their resources. In the other words, the speedup ra-
tio demonstrates the performance benefits of the distributor
from using the game theoretic framework.
Figure 6 shows the speedup ratio for the first case where
selected neighboring nodes are available during the whole
computation. We use three audio files with sizes of 100MB,
300MB, and 600MB. The number of neighboring nodes
are randomly selected from a power law distribution. Fig-
ure 6 shows how our method significantly improves the job
completion time in comparison to the time taken in locally
executing the job. This figure shows that for all of our cho-
sen file sizes, our method can improve the job completion
time by about a factor of 5.
Table 2: Comparison of the mobility aware approach with fixed and adaptive time intervals between auctions.
Intel research lab Computer lab Infocom
Approaches Completion Number of Percentage of Completion Number of Percentage of Completion Number of Percentage of
time(second) auctions disconnected nodes time(second) auctions disconnected nodes time(second) auctions disconnected nodes
T = 20s 2109 119 0.04 2100 119 0.054 2632 153 0.066
T = 200s 2646 15 0.247 3021 18 0.4 3776 23 0.43
T = 500s 3288 7 0.267 3718 10 0.5 4725 12 0.57
Heuristic approach 2337 19 0.16 2294 33 0.16 2997 43 0.2
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Figure 5: Speedup ratio of mobility aware approach using our heuristic to adaptively select the time interval
between auctions for different file sizes, (a) 100MB, (b) 300MB, (c) 600MB.
Table 2 shows the job completion time, number of pre-
formed auctions, and the percentage of disconnected nodes
in case of mobility for the three real contact traces. In this
table, we compare the results of fixed time intervals with
our heuristic approach for adaptively selecting the time in-
tervals between auctions. In this experiment, the file size is
set to 600MB. We make the following observations from Ta-
ble 2. First, as the time interval between two auctions (T )
increases or the number of performed auctions decreases,
the job completion time and the percentage of disconnected
nodes increase. By increasing the time interval, the per-
centage of disconnected nodes increases and the distributor
also misses some of the newly arriving nodes. This reduces
the number of tasks that are being executed in parallel, and
consequently the job completion time increases. Second, the
fixed time interval approach performs well in terms of job
completion time for small values of T . For large values of
T , this approach preforms well in terms of overhead, i.e.,
the number of performed auctions. Thus, finding the right
value for T where it preforms well in terms of both the job
completion time and the overhead depends on the mobil-
ity patterns of mobile nodes. Third, the heuristic approach
preforms well in terms of both the job completion time and
the overhead without requiring any prior knowledge of the
mobility patterns of mobile nodes.
Figure 7, compares the performance of our heuristic ap-
proach for finding time intervals between auctions with the
fixed time intervals approach, when nodes are mobile. In this
figure, the x-axis represents the normalized job completion
time, and the y-axis represents the normalized number of
preformed auctions. Our goal is to reach to the left bottom
corner of the figure where minimum job completion time and
minimum overhead exist. Figure 7 shows that the heuristic
approach outperforms the fixed intervals method and gets
close to the left bottom corner.
Next, we compare the job completion time of the mobil-
ity aware approach with that of local execution using the
three real world contact traces for different file sizes. Fig-
ure 5 shows the speedup ratio of the mobility aware ap-
proach using our heuristic approach. This figure shows that
the speedup ratio is close to 3. However, the amount of im-
provement in the Infocom05 contact trace is a less than the
other contact traces. This is because the average percentage
of disconnected nodes in the Infocom05 trace is larger than
the other traces (see Figure 3).
To further analyze the effect of contact traces, we use two
synthetic mobility models to generate the contact traces.
Specifically, we use the Slaw [12] and RandomWalk mobility
models. In our setting, we assume that 20 mobile nodes
move in an area of 1000m × 1000m for one hour and each
mobile node has a circular transmission range of 150m. Also,
the audio file size is set to 600MB.
Figure 8 shows the speedup ratio of mobility aware ap-
proach with fixed and heuristic approaches for selecting the
time interval between auctions in the Slaw and Random
Walk models. This figure shows that our proposed model
can improve the job completion time by a factor of 5 to 7
in the Slaw model (that mimics the human walk patterns).
However, the speedup ratio of the mobility aware approach is
at most 3 in the RandomWalk model. This is because, in the
Random Walk model, mobile nodes continuously move from
one location to the another in a random fashion. Accord-
ing to our measurements in the Random Walk model, more
than half of the selected neighboring nodes get disconnected
before completing their tasks, consequently increasing the
job completion time. However, we can still improve the job
completion time by a factor of 3 for small fixed time interval
(T = 20s) at the cost of increased auction overhead. Fur-
thermore, we can improve the job completion time by factor
2 using our heuristic approach without significantly increas-
ing the communication overhead. According to our experi-
ments, the number of preformed auctions using the heuristic
method and using a small fixed time interval (T = 20s), are
59 and 110, respectively. It should be noted that for a high
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Figure 6: Speedup ratio without considering mobil-
ity for different file sizes.
mobility contact trace (such as Random Walk), there is a
higher change of contact among mobile nodes. Therefore, we
can still improve the job completion time. Also, it is worth
mentioning that by reducing the time interval between auc-
tions or equivalently reducing the workloads of the assigned
tasks, we can further improve the speedup ratio, but at the
cost of increased overhead.
To understand the impact of the number of nearby nodes,
we vary the number of mobile nodes between 10 and 50 with
increments of 10, in the Slaw model. Figure 9 shows the job
completion time of the proposed approach using the Slaw
mobility model as a contact trace. This figure shows that
as the number of nodes increases, the job completion time
decreases by more than 40%, when fixed time intervals (T )
are used. Job completion time reduces from 1486 to 833
seconds for T = 20 seconds, from 1888 to 1055 seconds for
T = 200 seconds, and from 2238 to 1324 for T = 500s.
In addition, this figure shows that our heuristic approach
preforms well in terms of job completion time.
Figure 10 shows both the job completion time and the
overhead (number of preformed auctions) using the Slaw
mobility model with different number of nodes. This figure
shows that for different number of nodes in the Slaw mobility
model, the heuristic approach preforms significantly better
than the fixed time intervals method, in terms of both the
job completion time and the overhead.
Finally, we evaluate our methods for DAG jobs. The
structure of jobs is the same as Figure 2 and the workloads
of jobs A, B, C, D, and E are 100, 50, 100, 100, 50 respec-
tively. Figure 11 shows the speedup ratio of the mobility
aware approach for DAG jobs, using the heuristic method
to select the time intervals. This figure shows that our pro-
posed approach improves the job completion time by factor
2.5 to 3 for DAG jobs. DAG jobs have the same behaviour
as the single job by varying the number of nodes or using
different mobility models.
7. CONCLUSION
We presented and evaluated a game theoretic framework
for task allocation in mobile cloud computing environments
comprising of selfish mobile devices. Specifically, we pro-
posed a multidimensional auction for allocating the tasks of
a job among nearby mobile nodes based on their computa-
tional capabilities and also the cost of computation at these
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Figure 7: Comparison of approaches with fixed and
heuristic-based time intervals between auctions, in
the presence of mobility.
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Figure 8: Speedup ratio of mobility aware approach
using fixed and heuristic-based time intervals be-
tween auctions in Slaw and Random Walk models.
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Figure 9: The job completion times for different val-
ues of T and the heuristic approach versus the num-
ber of nodes in the Slaw mobility model.
nodes with the goal of reducing the overall job completion
time and be beneficial to all the parties involved. We con-
sidered node and task heterogeneity as well as node mobility
in developing our methods. Our evaluations demonstrated
the benefits of our methods.
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